THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS LUFKIN DIVISION

STATE OF TEXAS

VS.

* Beaumont, Texas
LEARJET 31A BEARING SERIAL * 10:10 a.m. - 12:14 p.m.
NUMBER 080 AND ASSIGNED AND * November 16, 2020 DISPLAYING REGISTRATION/TAIL * NUMBER N260RC

NO. 9:20-CV-172-MJT

STATE OF TEXAS

VS.

NO. 9:20-CV-175-MJT * Beaumont, Texas

CESSNA 560 CITATION JET *
BEARING SERIAL NUMBER * 10:10 a.m. - 12:14
560-0068 AND ASSIGNED AND * November 16, 2020 DISPLAYING REGISTRATION/TAIL * NUMBER N569LM

* 10:10 a.m. - 12:14 p.m.

MOTION HEARING

BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL J. TRUNCALE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

* * * * *

Proceedings recorded by computer stenography Produced by computer-aided transcription

> EDWARD L. REED 9251 Lynne Circle Orange, Texas 77630 * 409-330-1605

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        JULIA COLYER
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   Court Reporter:
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        EDWARD L. REED
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PROCEEDINGS

10:10 A.M. - NOVEMBER 16, 2020 THE COURT: The Court will now call for hearing the case of the State of Texas vs. Cessna 560 Citation Jet Bearing Serial Number 500-0068 and Assigned and Displaying Registration/Tail Number N569LM, Case Number 9:20-CV-175; and State of Texas vs. Learjet 31A Bearing Serial Number 080 and Assigned and Displaying Registration/Tail Number N260RC, Case Number 9:20-CV-172. My intent today is to consolidate these hearings, since there are some joint issues pertaining to both cases. However, to the extent we may need to deal with an issue that's specific to one case, I think we can parse that out and make the record clear. Does anyone have any objection to our proceeding jointly? MR. COLEMAN: No objection from the State, Your Honor. MR. EVANS: No objection, Your Honor. No objection. MR. BISHOP: Okay, are the parties ready? THE COURT: MR. COLEMAN: Tommy Coleman for the State of Texas, present and ready to proceed, Your Honor.

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MR. EVANS:

Gary Evans of Coats & Evans PC,

representing the Cessna Citation, Your Honor, ready to proceed.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

MR. BISHOP: Matt Bishop here for the defendant in the Learjet 31A case, and I'm ready.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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I would also say, please be sure to speak directly into the microphone. I was told that for 34 years when I tried cases in this courtroom and I never really appreciated that until I took the bench and found out how bad the acoustics really are in this courtroom. And not just for my sake, but for the court reporter, and obviously that's important because if the court reporter doesn't hear it, it wasn't said.

Another thing I did notice. We tried a criminal jury trial recently in this courtroom and I made that comment reminding the attorneys to be sure and speak into the microphone, and as I said that, several of the jurors nodded their heads up and down like, "Thank you." So it's amazing. You think that your voice carries, but it doesn't. So I see we've got the lectern up. It might be a good time to talk into that.

All right. As I understand it, with the Cessna -- and I'm going to say "Cessna case" and "Learjet case." And we all know, because I've

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described which case it was when we opened, that's what we're talking about. I may talk about the Cessna case and Learjet case. Is that okay? MR. COLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor, that's fine by the State. THE COURT: Okay. And as I understand it, in the Cessna case we're here today on defendant's Motion to Dismiss, which is document number 3. Also, on the plaintiff's, the State's Motion to Remand; correct? MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, in light of the Court's ruling in the Learjet case, I would like to withdraw my Motion to Remand in the Cessna case. THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. Coleman. I appreciate that. In fact, I was going to ask you if that would be fine. Actually, since I ruled on that in the Learjet case, I'm even more convinced that I made the right call on that because of the federal issues that predominate as to whether or not these jets are properly registered under Federal Aviation regulations.

20 And it is pretty clear to me that since that's really,

I think, one of the things we're talking about, those

federal issues would predominate.

Now, on the Learjet case, we're also here on the Motion to Dismiss. And there's also in the Learjet a Motion to Access the aircraft and perform

1 necessary maintenance. That's document number 13. 2 And I think that incorporates a Motion for Protective 3 Order. Am I correct on that, Mr. Bishop? 4 MR. BISHOP: That's correct, Your Honor. Ι 5 think we actually filed them as two separate motions 6 because that's how the clerk wanted them filed. 7 a Motion to Access and one is a Motion for Protective But it's essentially the same subject matter. 8 And that is set for today. However, I would suggest 9 10 that we don't need to reach that if the Motion to Dismiss is granted and the planes are released to the 11 12 owners. 13 THE COURT: Well, I was going to ask you that, so you answered my question before I could ask you the 14 15 question. So thank you very much. 16 And just so I understand, Mr. Evans, 17 the Cessna case we don't have before us, I don't think, 18 a motion for either protective order or a motion for 19 access to the aircraft nor to perform maintenance? 20 MR. EVANS: That's affirmative, Your Honor. We do have -- we received some documents from the State 2.1 22 indicating the periodic required maintenance that's 23 being performed to the citation. However, it did commence in August. That comes under the heading of 24 25 "locking the barn after the horse is stolen" because

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the aircraft sat for six to seven months with no attention whatsoever and, in the process, has incurred about \$270,000 worth of damages as a result.

But the State did start maintaining it in August of 2020 and I believe we have records indicating

August of 2020 and I believe we have records indicating now for August, September, and October of 2020 provided by Mr. Coleman.

THE COURT: Yes, okay, good.

MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, I'm sorry, if I may respond?

THE COURT: Please, of course.

MR. COLEMAN: I am prepared and I brought a witness here today who's willing to testify as to the maintenance of the two aircraft at issue here today and whether or not they are being properly maintained if the Court is so inclined to hear from that witness.

THE COURT: All right, who are the witnesses who are here?

MR. COLEMAN: The witness that I will be calling to testify is Milton Purvis, and he is an aircraft mechanic who's been charged with maintaining the two aircraft at issue, the Learjet and the Cessna, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Vurvis, V-u-r-v-i-s?

MR. COLEMAN: Purvis with a P, Your Honor.

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1	THE COURT: With a P?
2	MR. COLEMAN: Yes, sir.
3	THE COURT: Purvis. And is he here with
4	Ms. Beatrice Purvis?
5	MR. COLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor, but I have no
6	intention of calling her as a witness.
7	THE COURT: I take it, Ms. Purvis, you are
8	here with Mr. Purvis to enjoy this beautiful day and to
9	keep him company?
10	MS. PURVIS: Yes.
11	THE COURT: Okay. Did y'all come up from The
12	Valley?
13	MR. PURVIS: Yes, sir.
14	THE COURT: All right. So his total
15	Mr. Purvis' testimony would be on the issue of
16	maintenance of the plane; correct?
17	MR. COLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: He's not here to testify about any
19	of the other motions; is that correct?
20	MR. COLEMAN: No, Your Honor, that's correct.
21	THE COURT: Do you have any other witnesses
22	you intend to call today?
23	MR. COLEMAN: No, Judge.
24	THE COURT: Okay. How about for the
25	defendants? Do y'all plan on calling any witnesses?
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1 MR. BISHOP: No, Your Honor, we don't. 2 No, Your Honor MR. EVANS: 3 THE COURT: I did anticipate that because I 4 think, really, most of what we're here to talk about 5 today are really issues that are under the pleadings. 6 Now, okay, let me ask this question, 7 Mr. Coleman. With regard to the motion with a notice 8 of seizure and forfeiture that's been filed in both cases, is the notice essentially the same, other than 9 10 the name of the jet and the name of the purported owners, a Mr. Camarillo Montemayor and Mr. Gonzalez 11 12 Barragan? 13 MR. COLEMAN: I think that's fair to say, Your They essentially mirror each other. 14 Honor. 15 Okay. All right, I do have some THE COURT: 16 questions that I want to ask and talk about kind of 17 before I let you all arque. I used to not always like 18 that because, when I prepared an argument, I was ready 19 And yet now I see that sometimes there may be to go. 20 things where the judge is really focusing on and maybe 2.1 you ought to listen to the judge's guestions and answer 22 those questions first. But it may modify some of your 23 presentation or either shorten or amplify portions of 24 it based upon what I see here and at least have some 25 concern about.

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First, I'm focusing on document 2 in the Learjet case, which is the Notice of Seizure. But it could also be essentially the same as document 2 in the Cessna case because it's the Notice of Seizure and Intended Forfeiture. So that's what I'm focusing on right now and I just want to kind of go through this.

In the Notice of Forfeiture and Seizure there is the allegation, at least, that the planes were used for a variety -- allegedly used for a variety of criminal activity. And in that notice they incorporate the affidavit of a constable by the name of Mr. Beau Price. And in paragraph 3 of the affidavit Mr. Price talks about, based upon investigation, there is possible -- possible illicit activity involving the aircraft. And I just wanted to ask you, Mr. Coleman, about that use of the word "possible."

MR. COLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor, I'm happy to respond. While that language in that particular paragraph admittedly equivocates, if you would refer to the -- I'm looking at the Learjet notice and the affidavit attached to that. Paragraph 23 is more definite. In fact, the language there states that, "Based on the totality of the circumstances, as indicated above, in my training and experience, I formed the opinion that the individuals involved in the

1 scheme violated numerous state and federal laws." 2 So, while he may equivocate earlier on in 3 the affidavit, he makes it clear at the end of the 4 affidavit that he has formed an opinion that there were certain law violations. 5 6 THE COURT: Yeah, okay. Well, and when we 7 talk about that, it's based upon -- I mean, as you 8 know, Mr. Coleman, I have, I'm sure you are aware, 9 entered forfeiture orders for all types of 10 devices (guns, automobiles, whatever) that were proven 11 used in the commission of crimes, including drug to be 12 So, I mean, the concept of issuing -- I'm not 13 opposed to issuing an order on forfeiture if it is 14 something that is based upon, you know, an actual 15 crime. 16 And in fact, as I look at the -- and this 17 really has not been briefed, and so I'll certainly 18 welcome additional briefing on it. But there are some 19 cases, state cases that say, in order to use this 20 state statute -- and I'm obligated to follow the state 2.1 forfeiture statutes; correct? 22 MR. COLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Is there any disagreement about 24 that? 25 MR. EVANS: Not from the Cessna Citation, no,

Your Honor.

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MR. BISHOP: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. There are a number of cases from different Courts of Appeals, State vs. \$99,235.00 in United States Currency. That's 511 S.W.3d, 136.

There is also the case of \$227,877 Currency Money of the United States vs. State, 331 S.W.3d, 110. Also, there is \$130,510 in U.S. Lawful Currency vs. State, 26 S.W.3d, 169. And there are other cases. But they all talk about you can only do -- see, there's probable cause in the context of forfeiture proceeding to form a reasonable belief that there is a substantial connection between the property to be forfeited and the criminal activity defined.

You can see there is some concern, then, when I see an affidavit presented to me that talks about "possible" illicit, as opposed to "probable."

Are there any specific facts alleged either in the notice or in the affidavit that tie either of these two planes to illegal activity -- I mean, something that would say, you know, we believe based upon our investigation that on a particular date the plane was used to transport money to another country for money laundering purposes, or something like that? Is there anything like that that I'm

missing?

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MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, if I may back up just a little bit, my understanding of the law is that the notice and the affidavit attached thereto, it does not have to be so specific -- it doesn't have to be overly specific, just specific enough to put the respondents on notice of the allegations and give them fair notice of what is alleged.

But with that being said, the Price affidavit makes mention of the fact that there were documents that were on file with the FAA and maintenance records in the logbook that indicates that these planes in this instance not only were not registered properly under Title 59 of the United States Code, but that they were also, in effect, exported under Title 50 of the United States Code in violation of that code.

Effectively, as Title 50 refers to, they were -- the control or effective control was given over to a non-citizen. And I understand that the respondents may dispute whether or not the trust was a proper document that conveyed the ownership or an interest to a non-citizen. I submit to the Court that that's a fact question for the trier of fact to determine whether or not it was sufficient.

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But the crux of what is alleged, I think, is specific enough to convey to the respondents that the allegation relies on whether or not there were registration violations under Title 49 of the United States Code, whether or not there were export violations under Title 50 of the United States Code, and a variety of other criminal offenses, Your Honor, which would include Title 18 Section 1001, which is making a false statement or falsifying to a government entity, which dovetails into the state allegations of wrongful or criminal activity, which includes filing a document by deception and the money laundering and also the engaging in organized criminal activity.

I'll state one other thing, Your Honor.

And I get the Court's concern about -- and typically,

I'll state one other thing, Your Honor.

And I get the Court's concern about -- and typically,
that's where we see the forfeitures is in the context
of these drug transactions involving drug dealers. And
as a state prosecutor for more than a decade, I've seen
my fair share of cash and cars and drug dealers. But
Chapter 59 is not limited to a drug transaction.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. COLEMAN: Chapter 59, the Code of Criminal Procedure makes it clear that certain enumerated felonies -- which specifically include Chapter 32 of the Penal Code, which is securing execution of a

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document by deception; Chapter 34 of the Penal Code, which is a money laundering statute; and also Chapter 71 of the Penal Code, which is the engaging of organized criminal activity -- those are specific enumerated offenses that effectively get you under Chapter 59, the forfeiture statute, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And, you know, again, I appreciate what you are saying. I'm looking, though, for facts in the affidavit. And we may discuss it later when we talk about the 12(b)(6) portion because, you know, this is now in federal court, and so I have to analyze pleadings in conjunction with the mandates of the United States Supreme Court in Iqbal and Twombly, whether the pleadings themselves provide sufficient information that would stand scrutiny under our federal rules.

But as I look at the affidavit, which is incorporated into the pleadings, it seems as if the connection -- alleged connection, I should say, is based upon -- and I'm looking at paragraph 6 of the affidavit -- based upon defendant's training and experience. And even if I look at paragraph 23 that you pointed out, it's "I formed the opinion." It seems as if the facts are based in the mind and or perceived experience and knowledge of the affiant. He's not

1 here, but actually, are there some other facts? 2 MR. COLEMAN: Actually, Your Honor, 3 Mr. Price is here. He just showed up. 4 THE COURT: He did? Okav. 5 MR. COLEMAN: For the record, he did. 6 THE COURT: All right. And then as I look, 7 too, at paragraph 9 of his affidavit, which is 8 included, I quess, for me to consider, he talks about several aircraft under AGC -- and that's this AGC Trust 9 10 that we're talking about -- are linked to multiple 11 federal investigations for drug smuggling operations 12 and several -- well, that paragraph would suggest that 13 this plane or planes are used in drug smuggling. 14 it says for several aircraft, but the affidavit does 15 not specify a Learjet involved here or Cessna plane. 16 What I'm driving at is, how does this affidavit tie 17 these two planes to illicit or illegal activity? 18 MR. COLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor. While one 19 could infer from that one paragraph that talks about 20 drug smuggling that perhaps that's an element or a part 2.1 of this particular case or these cases, the focus --22 the majority of this affidavit by Mr. Price, for 23 instance, focuses on in paragraph 12 the statutory trust and the fact that it is improper in that it is 24 25 effectively giving control of this plane, as put forth

in Title 50 of the United State Code, to a non-citizen.

It also refers to, in paragraph 13, improper registration; and later on in the affidavit, improper registration as reflected in paragraph 17, that there is no data on file with the Electronic Export Information System that would indicate that this plane was properly -- or a license was sought to properly export this plane.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

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MR. COLEMAN: If you skip down to Paragraph

19, these are more specific facts here, the fact that
this particular plane spent a significant amount of time
outside of the United States; which again would lend
itself to, as the distinction is made in Title 50, more
than just a "temporary sojourn." This was, in effect,
an exportation in violation of the United States Code.

And then, Your Honor, there is also some allegations about violation of tax as well. But this is more than mere conjecture on the part of Mr. Price. Also, he makes reference to an opinion that was sought form the chief counsel from the Department of Commerce that also was incorporated into his determination that he made that he relied on.

So I would submit to the Court, while this is not super detailed, a super detailed affidavit, it

is fair notice and it's enough notice to put the defense or the respondents on notice that we're alleging violations of Title 49 of the United States Code, Title 50 of the United States Code, and numerous violations under Title 18 of the United States Code.

THE COURT: Okay. And before I let the defendants respond to this segment, I've got some other things I want to ask.

But back to this, it's several aircraft that are under these AGC Trusts are used in drug smuggling. That was put in the affidavit asking this Court to issue an Order of Forfeiture of both of these jets.

I can't help but also, in looking at the pleadings before the Court, note in Learjet, document 15, which is a supplement to the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to a 12(b)(6), that there is an e-mail from Mr. Price to a Tom McMenamin where a reference is made to both of these jets, the Learjet and the Cessna, stating, "Neither were 'dope jets', both used for personal transport, so they don't look gutted out."

Well, this, which is part of a pleading before the Court, this e-mail would tend to refute that anything having to do with this plane being used for drug smuggling, and yet that's part of the affidavit

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that is presented to me to ask me to cause both of these planes to be forfeited.

MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, respectfully, I have no control over what Mr. Price put in his affidavit, and Mr. Price chose for whatever reason to put these excerpts in there about drug smuggling, and in some e-mail that is not a part of the pleadings he made reference to a dope plane.

I want to be clear with the Court that the crux of the State's argument for forfeiture under Chapter 59, it falls under the violation or violations of Title 49 of the United States Code, the registration requirement; title 50 of the United States Code, the export requirements; and various other criminal statutes, including Title 18 and the state statutes of money laundering, executing a document by deception and engaging in money laundering.

That is the basis for which we are asking the Court for relief under Chapter 59, Judge, and regardless of what extraneous references Mr. Price may have made to drug smuggling or dope planes in communications.

THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. Coleman.

And to the defendants, Mr. Bishop,

Mr. Evans, I don't want to necessarily -- I mentioned

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12(b)(6) and there are some other arguments I think we probably need to discuss about that. But just based upon this aspect, and I'm focusing on the probable cause aspect of a forfeiture proceeding, do you all have any comments you wish to make as to that at this time?

MR. BISHOP: Thank you, Judge, and I'll be brief. I think that you hit the nail on the head in that there has been no allegations of any actual crime and no proof or probable cause that either of these jets have been linked or involved in any sort of crime. And we had discussed this at some length at the last hearing, but again, it all goes back to an idea, which is completely erroneous, that because these jets like thousands of other jets are owned through a non-citizen trust, that that, in and of itself, somehow gives

Mr. Price probable cause to seize these jets. That's simply not the case.

And in the affidavit there is discussion of, well, at least in my case, Mr. Camarillo is a citizen of Mexico. As I said last time, that's absolutely true. There is no affidavit testimony that anything specifically with the registration is fraudulent. There is no affidavit testimony that any specific documents were fraudulently filed. It all

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attachment to a pleading.

goes back to this idea, which again is entirely erroneous that the non-citizen trust, which the FAA approved and registered these aircraft through, that, in and of itself, entitles Mr. Price and Polk County to go and seize these jets. And I think what underscores that is one of the other e-mails that was in the supplement that I filed from the documents that I got from Mr. Coleman is Mr. Price's other statement that this is the first of MANY, which is in all caps, jets that they intend to And I understand that that's not in their pleading, but I think it lays bare the intent here, which is, look, there's --THE COURT: Well, that was in the e-mail, which is attached to document 15 of Learjet's -- it's a supplemental response -- supplemental motion to 12(b)(6), as I recall. MR. BISHOP: That is correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: So this is a part of the pleadings before the Court. And to clarify, I meant MR. BISHOP: Yes. it's not contained within their Notice of Forfeiture. Okay, I got it. THE COURT: MR. BISHOP: But I did file that as an

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. BISHOP: So it is in the papers of the Court. And I think the significance of that is it lays bare a plan to seize how far many jets that they can get their hands on that are registered through the non-citizen trust. And there is another part of one of those e-mails, I'm sure, that it didn't escape your attention, where it talks about an auction fee. So the idea here is, well, without any allegation that there has been any actual crime committed, they would round up all these jets, seize them, seek forfeiture, and auction them off.

So that is what is going on, Judge. But to your questions more specifically about the affidavit, I think that there is nothing within the affidavit which would allow or which would suffice to satisfy their burden. There are no factual allegations within that affidavit that show that any crime has been committed. There is a bunch of extraneous stuff about ghost planes and generalities of other investigations, but there is not one single statement in that affidavit -- in fact, in either one -- that would satisfy their burden and show that there is probable cause that these jets are linked in any way to any criminal act that's been committed.

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So I think it may be your intention to get into the 12(b)(6) a little bit later, but I think that goes to the heart of that motion as well. THE COURT: I do, yes. Mr. Evans, do you have anything you want to add to that? Just briefly, Your Honor. MR. EVANS: filed a supplement as well. I've got extra copies if the Court if the Court doesn't have one, and I provided a copy to Mr. Coleman as well this morning. But in the supplement, I spent some time yesterday looking at the FAA registry. And just five companies identified 7,860 aircraft that are held in trust typically for non-U.S. citizens. Because if you are a U.S. citizen, there is no problem with registering an aircraft with the FAA. 7,860 aircraft. And the problem that we have with the Price affidavit is just as the Court laid out. searched high and low trying to find facts that we could, you know, wrap our arms around and understand the basis upon which the State is seeking to forfeit a million-dollar-plus asset, and we found none. believe that there is anything that would begin to fulfill the State's burden in that regard.

But the biggest problem with the Price

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affidavit, as well, Your Honor, is that you could make the same vague ambiguous claims against virtually any aircraft on the FAA registry that happens to be held in trust, and there would be no way of separating the wheat from the chaff, so to speak. So we've got a whole bunch of chaff, not so much wheat, and we don't believe that there is any probable cause, at least that we've been able to ascertain from the Price affidavit.

And, of course, we completely agree with my colleague's argument as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And if the planes were forfeited, then they would be -- the State would be entitled to auction these planes off; correct?

MR. EVANS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And the owners through a trust would lose their possession, right to control, right to use million dollar assets; is that correct?

MR. EVANS: Absolutely, Your Honor.

And I'd like to add that the way that these cases have developed is they started off with a non-sworn detention of the aircraft by the Bureau of Industry and Security in both cases, a couple of individuals that are employed by that agency in the Houston area. And so they'll come in and detain the aircraft and say, you know, "We're looking at your

1 aircraft, possible export violations," but there is no 2 probable cause, there is no affidavit, there is no 3 sworn instrument of any kind. Who does this? 4 THE COURT: 5 MR. EVANS: The Bureau of Industry and 6 Security, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Is that a federal? 8 Yes, Your Honor, it's a segment of MR. EVANS: 9 the Department of Commerce. But that's not what happened here, 10 THE COURT: was it? 11 12 MR. EVANS: Yes, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. EVANS: In both cases they started off 15 with a detention of the aircraft --16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 -- without any sworn affidavit, MR. EVANS: 18 any sworn instrument, which raises our concerns, as we 19 put in our pleadings, about the entire application of 20 the Fourth Amendment. Because in our case the citation 2.1 was detained for over six months under the auspices of 22 a BIS (Bureau of Industry and Security) investigation. 2.3 And then when BIS was finished with this inquiry and concluded that nothing untoward was happening with the 24 25 aircraft, the aircraft was summarily released to Mr.

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Coleman and his colleagues for prosecution. that's how the aircraft are being detained for an extended period of time. THE COURT: Okay, this department released its hold on the airplane? MR. EVANS: Yes, Your Honor. At that point could your client THE COURT: have flown off to Hawaii in it or wherever they want to go? If they had any understanding as MR. EVANS: to when that was going to occur, Your Honor, conceivably. But basically, they were informed, "We're finished with your aircraft, and if you need to have -if you would like to, you know, have anything to do with your aircraft, go see Mr. Coleman and his colleagues because we turned it over to the State of Texas." THE COURT: Okay. MR. EVANS: So that was uninterrupted continued detention of the aircraft. Okay. So that's something that THE COURT: precedes this. But that really -- the issues you raised about a Fourth Amendment violation, that's not the State of Texas. The State of Texas did not do that; correct?

1 MR. EVANS: Correct, Your Honor. 2 So, I mean, I appreciate the THE COURT: 3 background information. But to the extent you may 4 claim a constitutional violation, that would be by a 5 department of the Federal Government that is not before 6 the Court right now; is that correct? 7 MR. EVANS: Yes, Your Honor. 8 We are here simply on the THE COURT: 9 forfeiture proceeding under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 59; correct? 10 11 Yes, Your Honor. MR. EVANS: 12 THE COURT: All right. And I am analyzing --13 I'm not discounting any of the prior statements or 14 concerns that you have made regarding whether those 15 investigations by a department of the Federal 16 Government are valid or not. I don't need to focus on 17 that to make a decision in this case; correct? 18 MR. EVANS: No, Your Honor, I just wanted the Court to be aware of --19 20 THE COURT: Yes. 21 -- the process that was involved. MR. EVANS: 22 And actually, the first step that the State took was to 2.3 articulate in the Price affidavit what we still consider to be a complete absence of probable cause to 24 continue the detention of the aircraft.

1 THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Is there 2 anything else you wanted to add? 3 MR. EVANS: No, Your Honor, thank you. 4 THE COURT: Okav. I want to now shift --5 these are some questions that I have. And then I do 6 want to let you all have, when I get through this, an 7 opportunity for you all to kind of go back to your mainline arguments in the case. Although you may, if 8 9 you've already made some of those comments, you might --I mean, I'll let you decide how you want to offer your 10 11 And if I hear some repetition, that's fine. arguments. 12 But I now want to go back to -- I'm 13 leaving this concept of probable cause and now I'm 14 focusing, though, on this statute, Code of Criminal 15 Procedure, Article 59. Let me make sure we're clear. 16 Mr. Coleman, is there any question that that is the 17 statute that I am obligated to follow if I am to grant 18 a forfeiture of these planes? 19 MR. COLEMAN: That is correct, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Because, as a federal court 21 sitting in Texas, I have to apply the law of the state; 22 correct? 23 MR. COLEMAN: That's correct, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: All right. Is there any 25 disagreement in that concept, Mr. Bishop and Mr. Evans?

1 MR. BISHOP: No, Your Honor. 2 No, Your Honor. MR. EVANS: 3 THE COURT: Okay. Now, there is something 4 that has come to my attention that was not briefed by 5 either party -- either side, I should say. 6 certainly, I'm going to raise this now. And if you all 7 need some additional time to submit some follow-up briefs, I'm certainly going to allow it. 8 9 But since you've told me that I must follow Article 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal 10 11 Procedure, I'm mindful of the fact that under Article 12 59.04(b) of that statute, a forfeiture proceeding -it says, "A forfeiture proceeding commences under this 13 14 chapter when the attorney representing the state files a notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture in the 15 16 name of the state with the clerk of the District Court 17 in the county in which the seizure is made." 18 Now, my question, Mr. Coleman, you are the 19 attorney who filed this on behalf of the State and you 20 filed it in the district clerk in Polk County; is that 21 correct? 22 MR. COLEMAN: That's correct, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. And it was removed to Federal Court, we've discussed that. 24 25 Question: Was the seizure of either of

these two planes made in Polk County?

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MR. COLEMAN: No, they weren't, Your Honor. However, my understanding of Chapter 59 -- and forgive me for not being able to cite the exact portion of 59 where it states this -- is that the State is also entitled to bring a forfeiture action in the county in which a criminal action could be pursued, if we chose to pursue it. And forgive me again, I don't have that statute in front of me.

THE COURT: Okay, I understand.

And let me just ask a generic question here. I don't see it pled, I don't see it in an affidavit, so I'm just asking, is there -- because if I were even to allow you to replead, could you in good faith replead and perhaps even proffer evidence that either of these two planes were ever in Polk County, flew over Polk County? Do you have any evidence of that or anything you could plead?

MR. COLEMAN: Well, Your Honor, certainly I would ask that the Court allow me, if you are so inclined, to supplement my -- or amend my pleading. But I'll concede that these planes, to my knowledge, have never been to Polk County.

THE COURT: Okay, that's fine. The reason I ask that, there are a couple of cases. In fact, my

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good friend, Judge Zeke Zbranek, over in Liberty County utilized this statute to forfeit a motorcycle. And the Court of Appeals reversed him under this very article, saying, "As we (the Court of Appeals) read Article 59.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Notice of Seizure and Intended Foreclosure must be filed in the District Court in the county in which the seizure was made." And so the seizure of that Harley Davidson motorcycle was deemed inappropriate. That case, by the way, is cited 1976 Harley Davidson Motorcycle vs.

State of Texas, 106 S.W.3d, 398.

There is also the case of Martinez vs.

State, which is 893 S.W.2d, 304, where it states, again using this same article, "The State shall commence proceedings within 30 days of seizure and it must be in the Notice of Seizure and Forfeiture" -- which is what the underlying pleading is here -- "must be filed with the clerk of the District Court in the county in which the seizure is made." And in that case the State of Texas asked the judge to go forward. And the Court of Appeals said no and, "We hold that the jurisdiction of forfeiture is governed by statute and notice must be filed as prescribed by the statute in the county where the property was seized, reversed and rendered."

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Again, I'm going let you all, if you need

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it -- and you may not have been expecting this today, I
don't know, and I'll let you all comment, too -provide the Court with some supplemental briefing on
this. But, I mean, how do I get around that statute?

MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, if I may respond. I
was able to find at least a couple of references under
Chapter 59 that talk about filing a forfeiture statute
or filing a forfeiture action in the county in which
the venue exists for prosecution.

I'll direct the Court to -- well, before I
direct the Court to those specific citations in Chapter
59, I'd like to direct the Court to our Notice of
Seizure and Intended Forfeiture chapters -- or paragraph

direct the Court to those specific citations in Chapter 59, I'd like to direct the Court to our Notice of Seizure and Intended Forfeiture chapters -- or paragraph 6 and paragraph 7. Under paragraph 6, we allege, under Chapter 59.023 of the Code of Criminal Procedure -- in the alternative, we allege a suit for what's called "proceeds" under Chapter 59. My understanding is that not only can you have a forfeiture action for the property, but for a financial -- or for the proceeds assigned to this particular criminal action.

And under Chapter 59.023, paragraph

(a)(3), it says specifically that an action may be brought in "the county in which venue existed for prosecution of an underlying offense for which the property is subject to forfeiture." That's one

1 reference in Chapter 59 of an instance where we --2 THE COURT: What was that last citation? 3 MR. COLEMAN: It was 59.023. 4 THE COURT: Wait. 5 Suit for Proceeds? (Pause) 6 MR. COLEMAN: Yes, sir. 7 THE COURT: Is this a Suit for Proceeds? 8 We've pled that, Your Honor, in MR. COLEMAN: 9 the alternative under paragraph 6. 10 It said proceeds were gained --THE COURT: 11 well, proceeds gained from the commission of an 12 offense, wouldn't that be something like, if they sold 13 some cocaine or marijuana or meth or some other 14 horrible drug and they sat there with a pile of money, 15 you could go after that pile of money? 16 MR. COLEMAN: In the traditional sense, Your 17 However, the State's position is that the term 18 of "proceeds" is not limited to that instance. 19 fact, the money laundering statute under Chapter 34 20 refers to either financing or investing in a financial 21 enterprise or property. 22 THE COURT: Okay. 23 MR. COLEMAN: And that would be the State's 24 position is that "proceeds" is expanded to fit that 25 definition.

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THE COURT: But right now, in terms of -- and I have to admit, and I welcome additional briefing on this subject, but proceeds, a Learjet or a Cessna jet sitting on a runway would not be proceeds; is that fair? MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, I would respectfully disagree with the Court on that. It's the State's position that that particular aircraft was the proceeds of either investing in or financing this scheme --THE COURT: Okay. -- this criminal enterprise that MR. COLEMAN: consisted of a sham trust that turned over what is referred to in Chapter 15 of the Code of Federal Registry, Section 740.15 -- which turned over effectively operational control to a non-citizen, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okav. MR. COLEMAN: I would also like to direct the Court's attention to paragraph 7 of our Notice of Seizure, which again pleads in the alternative that under Chapter -- well, while it's not specifically cited here, under Chapter 59.022 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, the forfeiture statute, it talks

about property that had been removed from the state.

Again, under paragraph B3, there is another reference

that a forfeiture action could be brought in the county in which venue existed for prosecution of the underlying offense, for which the property is subject to forfeiture.

THE COURT: Okay. This property has not been removed from the State of Texas, though, I mean; right?

I mean, it's in Brownsville or some place; right?

MR. COLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor, currently. The State's position is that it had been removed from the state. And even more than that, Judge, there are at least two references in this Chapter 59 statute that talks about a forfeiture being able to be brought in a county in which the underlying criminal offense could have been prosecuted.

It's the State's position that it is not an offense -- it is -- the statute, in its intent, legislative intent, is not offended by use being able to bring a forfeiture action in the county in which we could have otherwise prosecuted the defendant for the underlying offense.

THE COURT: Yeah, I appreciate your comment.

I would just note, Article 59.022 subpart (a) says,

"This article applies to contraband, other than real
property, that is determined to be located outside of
this state." So I think right now this property is not

1 outside of the state; is that fair? 2 That's correct, Your Honor. MR. COLEMAN: 3 THE COURT: Okay, I appreciate your comments 4 Again, I may have sprung this issue on you 5 all because I didn't see it briefed, and I do welcome 6 additional briefing on it by both sides, but I'll allow 7 the defendants to make comment about this issue that I've raised. 8 9 MR. EVANS: May it please the Court, Your 10 Honor? 11 THE COURT: Yes. 12 MR. EVANS: We agree that -- we raised this 13 issue in our Motion to Dismiss on behalf of the 14 Citation in somewhat of a circuitous manner because we 15 styled it as improper venue. 16 THE COURT: Well, we're going to talk about 17 that in a minute, but go ahead. 18 MR. EVANS: And we remain perplexed, Your 19 Honor, as to how the State saw fit to bring suit in 20 Polk County to begin with. Polk County has --21 Is this substantive or procedural? THE COURT: 22 MR. EVANS: I think it's a little bit of both, 2.3 Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 25 Because in our view, the aircraft MR. EVANS:

1 was clearly seized in Southern Texas, in Cameron County. 2 THE COURT: The Cessna was? 3 MR. EVANS: Yes, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Do you know about the Learjet? 5 Was it also seized down there? Your Honor, both of them were 6 MR. BISHOP: 7 seized at the Brownsville Airport, which is Cameron 8 County. 9 Okay, that's all I need to know, THE COURT: 10 Okay, good. Continue on. yeah. 11 And the citation was subsequently MR. EVANS: 12 relocated by the State or by BIS. I think it was 13 probably BIS at the time, from Brownsville to Harlingen. 14 THE COURT: Who did that? 15 It was either the Bureau of MR. EVANS: 16 Industry and Security or it was --17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. EVANS: I suspect they had control over 19 the aircraft at the time. This is Mr. Mr. McMenamin, 20 which appears in the e-mail the Court referred to. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. EVANS: And so our reading is consistent 2.3 with the Court's interpretation that the suit should have been brought in the Southern District -- you know, 24 25 in the county in which the seizure took place. So that

would be Cameron County, and that we don't see how venue would be proper in Polk County. And also, even if the aircraft -- well, none of these underlying activities, Your Honor, took place or could have had some type of criminal impact in Polk County. Because to the extent the State is complaining about the manner in which the aircraft was held in trust by a non-U.S. citizen, that goes squarely to the FAA and how it orchestrates and permits the ownership of aircraft by a non-U.S. citizen.

THE COURT: If we assume for the sake of the argument -- and I think in considering pleadings, I must take as alleged whatever is true -- your Cessna

argument -- and I think in considering pleadings, I must take as alleged whatever is true -- your Cessna plane you represent was registered improperly in violation of every single federal aviation regulation known to the United States Government. Let's just assume that, okay? Therefore, it needs to be seized; right?

Under this statute, the Notice of

Forfeiture and Seizure would have to be filed in the

county where the plane was seized, and that's assuming

that it violated all the regulations of FAA?

MR. EVANS: That is exactly our understanding,

THE COURT: Okay. So that the State of Texas,

1 which presumably operates in all 254 counties, and 2 their U.S. Attorneys that also operate -- you know, we 3 have four districts, and their U.S. Attorneys, if they were working in conjunction with either state 4 5 prosecutors or federal prosecutors, they could come in, 6 in one of 254 counties in Texas and seize -- file it 7 within 30 days after they seized it in whatever of the 8 254 counties; correct? 9 MR. EVANS: Yes, Your Honor. In fact, if I 10 could point out, this doesn't relate to this 11 proceeding, but in an unrelated case that's exactly 12 what the State has done. They seized a Hawker aircraft worth about two and a half million dollars on the 13 14 ground at Hobby Airport. In that case, that case was 15 properly filed in Harris County, Texas. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 Because the aircraft that was MR. EVANS: 18 seized, it's physical location was Hobby Airport in 19 Harris County. That case has been removed to the 20 Southern District. 21 THE COURT: True. 22 MR. EVANS: So that tracks Rule 59, in our 2.3 view, as far as where the proceeding should have been 24 brought. 25 So, under that situation, then, THE COURT:

the Court -- if that was filed in 30 days and it is removed to Federal Court and assuming everything else is appropriate to issue a seizure and forfeiture, the Federal Court in the Southern District could so order; correct?

MR. EVANS: Yes, Your Honor, presumably.

THE COURT: Okay.

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All right. Mr. Bishop, do you have any further comments on that?

MR. BISHOP: Well, I don't want to echo what Gary just said, but I do think that even though this wasn't in the briefing, the fact that there was not a Notice of Seizure filed in -- and it would either be in Cameron County, or I think Harlingen is in Willacy County, one of those two counties, wherever the State seized the plane -- within 30 days, because they did not do that and because we know neither aircraft has been removed from the state, and I think the idea that somehow these aircraft are proceeds, number one, I don't think it applies, and even if it did apply, wouldn't allow for these notices to be filed in Polk Because of the notice of -- before we even get to all the other questions, the Notices of Seizure that were filed on their face and according to Chapter 59, are defective.

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county, and --

THE COURT: I'm curious. I asked that question, is it procedural or substantive? And again, I've been kind of holding off on this 12(b)(6) analysis. But it seems like every time we kind of start rubbing up on it, you know. And I kind of saved 12(b)(6) for last, you know, but we kind of keep rubbing on it a little bit here. Would that be something that in a Notice of Seizure you would have to plead and then offer some evidence on? I'm talking about the seizure part. Well, you mean in --MR. BISHOP: THE COURT: In other words, to ask a Court to seize a plane, you would have to say, "Court, we're asking to seize this plane and forfeit it, and that's what this pleading is. And yes, we filed it in Polk County because that's where the plane was seized." Would that be part of the element of proof you would have to prove -- you would have to make in order to be successful in a forfeiture and seizure proceeding? I know I'm asking these question and maybe I need to give you guys little more time to brief this for me, but I'm just asking, what do you think? MR. BISHOP: Well, I think it is, Judge, and I think that Chapter 59 is clear that 30 days in the

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THE COURT: I mean, I think of a lot of other pleadings or like conditions precedent have been -- all that stuff has to be pled before you can hit pay dirt on your deceptive trade practice claim or whatever it is you're seeking. Do you know what I mean? It's part of the elements of proof to get to a successful resolution for the plaintiff.

MR. BISHOP: That's right, Judge. And I think that because in this instance the notice was not filed under 5904, and I haven't briefed it --

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. BISHOP: -- but I certainly don't believe that any of the exceptions or in other circumstance provisions of that code, of Chapter 59, would take it out of that. I do think that because they didn't do that, they could never be successful under Chapter 59.

THE COURT: Mr. Coleman, would there be -- I can't think of a way to put the cork back into the champagne. Is there -- you know, and I'm rubbing up on this 12(b)(6) issue, I've been saving it for last, but is there some way, if you were allowed to replead, you could ever replead facts that would in good conscience allege that the plane was seized in Polk County or any other county within the Beaumont Division of the Eastern District of Texas?

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Criminal Procedure.

MR. COLEMAN: Well, first of all, Your Honor,
I'd like to point out that in paragraph 1 and paragraph
2 of the Notice of Seizure, under paragraph 1 it says
this proceeding is brought by virtue of Chapter 59 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. It doesn't limit
itself to any one specific section of Chapter 59. It
just says by virtue of Chapter 59.

Paragraph 2 goes on to state that
jurisdiction is conferred by virtue of not only the
Texas Constitution, but also Article 59 of the Code of

So, if it's pled, at least the condition precedent, in my opinion, it's pled generally or broadly here, Your Honor. And if the Court is not inclined to go along with the argument of jurisdiction is conferred under Chapter 59.04(b), then again alternatively, the State has pled --

THE COURT: The proceeds.

MR. COLEMAN: -- the proceeds under 59.023 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which clearly allows a suit to be brought in the county in which the criminal prosecution could have been sustained.

THE COURT: Okay, I may allow both sides some additional time to file some supplemental briefing on this, if you think it would be helpful. I know time is

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of the essence with these planes. If I were to allow that, would seven days be sufficient amount of time for you all to get in some supplemental briefing on this to the Court? MR. COLEMAN: That's enough time for the state, Your Honor. MR. EVANS: Certainly, Your Honor, for the citation. I don't want to speak for Mr. Bishop. MR. BISHOP: That's plenty of time, Judge. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. I just raise this point. Now, I do want to just ask something, and maybe this is overkill, I don't know, but I ask this to the defendants. Under your 12(b)(2) -- your 12(b)(2) motion, I must say, isn't this an in rem action? MR. EVANS: It is absolutely an in rem action, And, you know, that pleading was filed very early on. We have a very short period of time to file a Motion to Dismiss. THE COURT: Didn't want to waive it? Yeah, we can certainly waive that MR. EVANS: with respect -- yeah, it is in rem. But I might also note for the Court that, you know, if the State truly believes that there is some type of criminal activity,

you know, tearing at the very fabric society, which

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pretty much kind of --

seems to be the allegation here, it should be noted that we're not aware of any criminal indictments against any of the folks that -- you know, they list these other individuals and entities in the pleading because they may have a property interest in the aircraft of some kind or nature. But there are no related criminal proceedings, which I believe it supports what Mr. Bishop was saying earlier, is that this, you know, this is an action in conversion and selling of very valuable assets. But with respect to the in rem, yes, Your Honor, it is over the aircraft, and we don't really reach the issues of personal and specific subject matter jurisdiction. THE COURT: Because an in rem action, really, jurisdiction of a person is really irrelevant. It's whether the Court has jurisdiction over the thing; right? MR. EVANS: Agreed, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Bishop, do you have any further comment on that? No, I echo Mr. Evans' comments. MR. BISHOP: THE COURT: Mr. Coleman, I don't know that there is a need to respond to that. I think they've

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Clerk.

MR. COLEMAN: If I could just briefly, Your You know, with regard to any criminal prosecution, I think the operative term that Mr. Evans used was that he's "not aware of" that there are any criminal indictments or criminal investigations that are forthcoming. But just to be clear, it is not necessary to have an actual criminal case to proceed under Chapter 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. THE COURT: Okay, thank you very much. Also, I want to just briefly touch on this venue issue that's been raised under 12(b)(3). 1441(a) expressly provides that the proper venue of a removed action is the District Court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. I mean, the defendants removed this case to me or to this court. Polk County is in the Beaumont Division of the Eastern District of Texas. Again, is there really -- is the venue really disputed here? MR. EVANS: No, Your Honor. The Lufkin Division. LAW CLERK: THE COURT: Oh, excuse me, I misspoke.

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We are sitting in Beaumont. This is a Lufkin

Actually, she's Judge Ron Clark's law clerk.

Division case and Clara Brown is my Lufkin Division Law

1 But Judge Clark is gracious enough to allow me to 2 utilize her many talents and insights. And so this is 3 a Lufkin case. 4 So, for the record whenever I have spoken 5 of this being in the Beaumont Division, I would like 6 the record to be clear, I spoke improperly. I made a This is the Lufkin Division, not the 7 mistakes. Beaumont Division. Can we get that clear for the 8 Any objection to that clarification for the 9 record? 10 record? 11 MR. COLEMAN: No objection from the State, 12 Your Honor. 13 MR. EVANS: No objection, Your Honor. 14 MR. BISHOP: No objection. 15 Okay, thank you very much. THE COURT: 16 I like Lufkin and I like to try cases up 17 there, but I guess I was looking at my Beaumont 18 courtroom here and got carried away with Beaumont for 19 the purposes. 20 All right, but back on the venue issue, 21 that's really not that big of a deal any more? 22 MR. EVANS: No, it's not, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. EVANS: Under the Federal Rules, there are 25 just precious few opportunities to raise concerns over

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where the case was removed. You know, in our view, it should have been brought in Cameron County and it would have been removed to the Southern District. So it was our way of going about and trying to raise that issue. THE COURT: Of course. MR. EVANS: We don't want to be viewed as trying that issue by consent. THE COURT: Right. Well, ultimately, on decisions like this, this is why I want to clear away some of this stuff so we know what we need to focus our attention on and not, because I don't want any motions lingering on that don't get addressed. So, Mr. Bishop, on the 12(b)(3)? I will adopt what Mr. Evans said. MR. BISHOP: Okay. And on the 12(b)(1), while THE COURT: we're just kind of talking about this, now, the argument is that there is no case or controversy because the issues are no longer alive because the airplane's ownership and operation is legal and complies with FAA regulations. Well, that's part of what the State is saying is not appropriate. that's -- am I missing something on that? MR. BISHOP: Judge, no, I think you are exactly right, and I think the issues, I think my

motion and Gary's are similar on that point and make

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essentially the same point that, look, the FAA scheme is entirely legal and valid because both of these aircraft have been registered under that. THE COURT: But in terms of dismissing a case under 12(b)(1) when the State is saying, well, there are some issues with regard to the legality and the compliance of FAA regulations, I mean, it would be difficult for the Court to dismiss under 12(b)(1), don't you think? MR. BISHOP: Well, yes. And I might suggest that 12(b)(6) would be the more appropriate dismissal. And I think that what I had both read and heard from the State --Is that there is a failure to THE COURT: state a claim?

MR. BISHOP: That's correct. And the claim that they have stated is not that there is anything wrong with these registrations in and of themselves. It is simply because they are registered as non-citizen trusts, therefore, they are illegal. And that simply doesn't give rise to any criminal offense, much less forfeiture or seizure under Chapter 59.

So I do think it's important -- and I understand that the Court will look at the pleadings, but I think it's important to note that what we have

1 here is simply a blanket claim, and I think Mr. Coleman 2 mentioned it's a sham trust, a scheme that turned over 3 operational control to a non-citizen. That's what he 4 mentioned in argument. 5 But, Judge, there is no allegation of what 6 makes either trust a sham trust. And in fact, what we 7 know is that --8 Well, that would be more of a THE COURT: 9 Iqbal Twombly argument, which should come under 12(b)(6), not under 12(b)(1). 10 11 MR. BISHOP: I agree, Your Honor. THE COURT: 12 So, just so I can kind of clear my 13 mind of this, really, there is no need really for the 14 Court to focus on, with all respect, the 12(b)(1), 15 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3) positions in your Motions to 16 Dismiss; is that fair? 17 MR. BISHOP: Yes, that's fair, Judge. 18 THE COURT: And Mr. Evans, I think you agree 19 with that? 20 MR. EVANS: Agreed, Your Honor. 21 Okay. Mr. Coleman, I think that THE COURT: 22 we don't we need to have argument on 12(b)(1) --23 MR. COLEMAN: No. 24 THE COURT: -- 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3). Do you agree? 25

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I agree, Your Honor. MR. COLEMAN: THE COURT: All right. Now, okay, I'm sorry, I may have thrown everybody's rhythm off a little bit. I've talked about some things -- asked questions about some things, I should say, that bump up on 12(b)(6) and I've heard various attorneys here make reference to it. I guess that you all may want to focus on the 12(b)(6) motion, but I'm also going to, as they said in the television show at the end of THE OUTER LIMITS, "We now return control of your television set I don't know if you remember that, but I now turn control of this hearing over to you all and let you make your comments. Now, a lot probably of your arguments may have already been made, I'm not sure, but that's okay. We've had discussion on some things that were of concern to me on the front end. Mr. Coleman, would you like to proceed? Actually, I think it would probably be best to --MR. COLEMAN: It's their motion, Your Honor. I'm happy to respond. It's their motion, that's correct. THE COURT: MR. COLEMAN: I'm happy to respond. THE COURT: And why don't we -- let's focus on the Motion to Dismiss. The Motion to Remand has been withdrawn, and let's talk about the Motion to Dismiss.

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And then after that, I will let you all go ahead, since you are here, and talk to me about your Protective Order and the Motion for Access, should that be necessary. All right.

MR. BISHOP: Thank you, Judge.

With respect to the 12(b)(6), I'll try not to rehash everything that's been said both today and a couple of weeks ago. But I think that the reason the dismissal is proper under 12(b)(6) is there simply is nothing in the pleading, no allegation that gives them, that stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The relief that they want is forfeiture of the aircraft. And the only allegation that they have made, I'd say, with any facts behind it is that these aircraft, in both cases, are registered and owned through a non-citizen trust. That's it. That's the only thing that is in their pleading. They claim that because they are owned through a non-citizen trust, that that links these aircraft into the criminal statutes that they cited and also somehow is a violation of export law, without providing any details of that. That's simply not the case.

And Mr. Evans mentioned earlier that he did a quick search of just five trust companies and found almost 10,000 aircraft that are registered

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through these trusts. The FAA regulations set out how these trusts need to be set up. And I know at least in my case, and I think in Gary's aircraft as well, we've attached to our motion a letter from the Office of Counsel of the FAA in which Mr. Webster, Senior Attorney for the FAA, reviewed the trust documents, reviewed the filings, the ownership structure, and specifically approved the trust documents for the Learjet.

So what we know is that the non-citizen trust is commonly used, and the whole point of the non-citizen trust is such that a non-U.S. citizen can registered an aircraft in the United States through the FAA and get an N number, a tail number. So, of course, the aircraft is used and controlled by a non-citizen. That's the point of the non-citizen trust.

Mr. Coleman says that's a violation of export laws because now the aircraft is controlled by a non-citizen. So it's a nonsensical circular argument that really goes back to the fundamental flaw, which is the State's idea that any aircraft -- and this must be their idea -- that any aircraft registered through the non-citizen trust ownership regime somehow is a sham trust and a criminal enterprise and subject to seizure, forfeiture, and auction by Polk County.

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There is no basis for that in the law. Even if every fact that is in Mr. Price's affidavit -and a lot of them are totally irrelevant anyway. even if all the facts are taken as true, there simply is no legal basis for forfeiture of the aircraft. It's The registration is valid, the registration mechanism and regime is provided under federal law and FAA regulations, and it was specifically, I'll say, approved by the Office of Counsel. So I think it's important not only for my client that obviously needs his aircraft released, which has been entirely unlawfully seized and kept for the better part of a year now, but I think it's also important that this case be dismissed to prevent the MANY other aircraft from being seized on the very same grounds. So, for those reasons -- and Mr. Evans may want to speak some to his aircraft or generally, but for those reasons, Judge, a dismissal under 12(b)(6) is the proper dismissal in this case. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Evans. EVANS: May I have a change of venue to the podium? THE COURT: You certainly may. That's kind of hard on -- you know, when I got in here, we had these

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tables going in an opposite direction and I saw about half the lawyers were sitting through these proceedings like this, because their backs were to me. That's terribly uncomfortable. So I changed it. So now everybody can kind of at least look in this direction without having to strain their neck.

But I notice when people -- you have to speak in these microphones and it's hard to bend over and it gets a little tiring. So that's what the podium is for.

MR. EVANS: I thank you, Your Honor. And my cervical spine thanks you.

Anything Mr. Bishop had to say, other to say I agree 100 percent with his comments about the system. I've been very privileged to be involved in aviation for 48 years. About 24 of those years was involved -- I was what they call a line pilot out there flying these types of aircraft every day, including the predecessor to the Learjet and also the predecessor to the Cessna Citation. They are marvelous business assets, and both of these companies use these aircraft specifically for business purposes, hence Mr. Price's comment that they seem to be an executive configuration.

Well, clearly, they are. And just as

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clearly, they are not dope jets. And I think based on the e-mail traffic, it's pretty clear also that Polk County and others saw a very large ray of dollar signs when they saw these aircraft tracking their previous efforts with oilfield type of tooling that have been confiscated and sold to benefit various law enforcement agencies. But I'd like to visit just for a second, Your Honor, on the --THE COURT: Before you do that, just so I'm clear, for a number of years you've represented people who own these types of aircraft? MR. EVANS: Yes, Your Honor. And, you know, most people go THE COURT: about their day-to-day business when they are flying on business, they fly commercial airlines and they hope and pray that they get to be in either group one or group two, or they are flying Southwest and they hope

MR. EVANS: Absolutely, Your Honor.

they don't get like number 78 or something. Right?

THE COURT: But then there are some people, business executives and what have you, who, I'm not saying their time is more valuable than anybody else's, but their time is pretty valuable and they need to get to where they are going in order to do business deals

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that create jobs and promote commerce. Is that fair? MR. EVANS: Absolutely, Your Honor. In fact, this is a large segment. We've had our firm -- we are a law firm that deals almost exclusively with aviation And we formed it in 1999 in Texas. matters. And we've dealt -- I've had the opportunity to serve as a trustee for an aircraft owned by a citizen of Mexico. didn't have time to wait on a bank, so I held my hand up and I said, "Hey, you want me to be the Trustee?" I owned a Citation Mustang for a year and And then they said, "We're going to sell it." a half. And I said, "Great, let's go sell it," and that was history. There are a lot of businesses THE COURT: here in the United States where people from other countries -- I know the Saudis have invested in the petrochemical industry down here in Southeast Texas, and I'm sure they come in to check on their investments and they probably don't stand in line hoping to get Group Number 1 and Group Number 2, do they? MR. EVANS: No, they don't, Your Honor. matter of fact, many, many large -- even large and small corporations use aircraft. I could cite to the Court all sorts of statistics that talk about business productivity. And when you're talking about the soft

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dollars and the significant amount of time and expense involved with executive time, that even though there is a substantial expense associated with these aircraft, that it operates to the net benefit of these corporations. THE COURT: Now, I'm not suggesting any of your clients would be involved in this, but I'm sure there are some people out there who use these planes, these jets to bring cocaine and heroin and meth up to the United States. Unfortunately, that's true, Your MR. EVANS: Honor. THE COURT: And they probably use it for money laundering and other things; correct? Doubtlessly. MR. EVANS: THE COURT: But the FAA regulations that are in play here, do they say, "Well, since somebody might use a plane illegally, we're not going to allow foreigners to open up these trusts and have planes that they can fly to the United States," and what have you? No, Your Honor, there is certainly MR. EVANS: no blanket denial in that regard. We do have things like what was referred generically as OFAC, and you certainly want to make sure that anybody that you're

going to serve as a trustee for is not somebody that's

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listed as a potential criminal actor on the OFAC list and things of that nature, and that's just good practice. THE COURT: If you had, though -- and I'm not saying any of your clients. But if there was probable cause to believe a plane was used for drugs, for money laundering, or for some other illegal or illicit act, would you agree that that plane should be seized and forfeited? As a substantial supporter of law MR. EVANS: enforcement, I would like not to see any aircraft used for an improper purpose, including drugs. THE COURT: I understand that. But assuming there is probable cause to believe that that's the case, a Court using Chapter 59 of the Criminal Code --Texas Criminal Code could properly have a plane seized and have it forfeited; correct? MR. EVANS: Absolutely, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. MR. EVANS: And we would just like again to have the opportunity to allow the owner to explain. Mr. Price stated in his affidavit, you know, they are not dope jets and they are in an executive configuration. And the folks that we work for, the folks associated with Ancheta, which is the equitable

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I'm just curious.

MR. EVANS:

owner of our aircraft, that's held in trust on the FAA registry, just business people using the aircraft for their own business and personal purposes. And they come up into the United States, they vacation in the United States, they make investments in the United States --They shop at The Galleria, too. THE COURT: I'm sure, certainly, Your Honor. MR. EVANS: And so it's doing -- and tracking Mr. Bishop's comments about the exigent nature of the circumstances we have here, Your Honor, these efforts, which really came about over about the last year and a half, have created a substantial dampening of the enthusiasm for citizens of Mexico to own aircraft and operate them into the United States. We're not aware of any other state other than Texas that is having to wrangle these cases. we're up to 12 or 14 aircraft between Mr. Bishop and our law firm and other law firms. We're probably aware of 12 or 14 cases all in Texas that have to do with these types of aircraft, unfortunately, having to deal with these types of circumstances. Where are most of those filed? THE COURT:

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Well, I described to the Court the

other one was seized at Houston Hobby.

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2 THE COURT: Right, I remember that one. 3 MR. EVANS: And that case was filed in Harris 4 And the other ones I don't believe have gotten 5 We're familiar with a bunch of aircraft that that far. 6 are currently being detained. 7 THE COURT: And again, if -- just so I'm 8 clear, if an aircraft, there is probable cause to 9 believe, is involved in illegal activity, was seized 10 in Harris County at Bush Airport, and within 30 days 11 they filed with the Harris County District Clerk a 12 Notice of Forfeiture and Seizure, then that would be 13 in compliance with Article 59 of the Texas Code of 14 Criminal Procedure; correct? 15 Yes, Your Honor MR. EVANS: 16 THE COURT: Okay. Continue. 17 And I'd just like to address very MR. EVANS: 18 quickly, Your Honor, this heavy burden of proof. 19 Because the State had every opportunity to come in with 20 an appropriate affidavit from Constable Price in order 2.1 to satisfy its heavy burden of proof. And that's what 22 we're saying, in part, on 12(b)(6) to the Court, that 23 the State has failed to fulfill that burden of proof. 24 As we talked about earlier, the party 25 seeking the forfeiture has the initial burden of

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establishing probable cause to believe the property is subject to forfeiture. That's the *United States vs.*\$87,113 in *United States Currency*. I'll admit the cites, Your Honor, it's in our pleadings already, unless the Court would like me to.

To establish probable cause, the

Government must demonstrate a reasonable ground for the

belief of guilt supported by no less than prima facie

proof -- "less than prima facie proof, but more than

mere suspicion." And we believe, Your Honor, that

that's what we have set forth in the Price affidavit is

mere suspicion with using words like "possible" and

"belief" and "opinion," that those words do not rise

above the level of mere suspicion. That's the same

case I cited to before and then citing other federal

cases as well.

The evidence, Your Honor, at the initial filing of this case, must raise more than mere suspicion. In other words, the State must prove that "it is more probable than not that the seized item was either intended for use in or derived from a violation of the enumerated offenses in the forfeiture statute." And that's the -- I don't I could pronounce this -- Vafaiyan, V-a-f-a-i-y-a-n, vs. State case. And that's a Texas appellate case out of Fort Worth.

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And we don't believe in this case, Your Honor, that the State has made any showing of a nexus between the money and the money laundering, organized crime, or any other alleged criminal activity that rises even slightly above the level of mere suspicion in support of our 12(b)(6), Your Honor.

If the Court would permit me, also in our pleadings, we have cited to Arizona vs. United States. And in that case, Your Honor, it has a very good discussion about the State not being able to insert itself in a controversy in which a federal agency has preempted that entire subject matter. States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. That is Gade, G-a-d-e vs.

National Solid Waste Management Association, 505 U.S.

88, at 115.

State laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law, including when they stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." That's Hines vs. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, at 67. But that goes to the entire -- as we set forth in our pleadings, Your Honor, the Federal Aviation Administration and occupies the entire space of aircraft registration,

operation, maintenance, repair, including this architecture.

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We've attached to our pleadings the 2013
Federal Register where the FAA came out and announced
to the world that it continues with the non-citizen
trust arrangement. And there are typically -- and
these documents are attached to our pleadings, as well,
Your Honor. There are two documents that set forth the
relationship. The Trust Agreement, which the equitable
owner of the aircraft, the trustor, conveys the
aircraft in trust to the Trustee, which is the United
States entity. And that's a number of those -- any
number of those 7,680 aircraft that identified in our
supplement that belong to just five companies that
provided trust services.

And then typically, you're going to have one of two documents that accompany the trust, Your Honor. One is an Operating Agreement, which allows the original trustor, the equitable owner, to exercise operational control over the aircraft. And you can also have a Lease Agreement. There are just some nuances associated with how the transaction is handled, but those are the two primary means of doing it.

I'd like to just capture a couple of final points, Your Honor.

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We talked about the entire space being occupied by the FAA. In our supplement that we filed, as I mentioned earlier, the aircraft, the Cessna Citation, because of improper storage of the aircraft, has suffered not less than \$270,000 worth of damage. We have repeatedly tried to encourage the State and others, including the Bureau of Industry and Security, in telling them that you can't just park one of these aircraft like you would put an automobile in an impound lot and just let it sit there for years. If you do, you're likely to lose all economic value of the aircraft. And so we have in the repair estimate that's attached to our supplement, a maintenance facility said, just for those two items, to remove those two engines and return them to the manufacturer, the engine manufacturer for recertification is \$135,000 per engine. And so we're talking about improper preservation and storage, leading to

20 substantial damages, which again goes to the exigency

21 of the situation that we have here, Your Honor. We

22 don't believe there is probable cause. There are no

23 |other criminal proceedings that we're aware of.

24 Mr. Coleman may be aware of them.

And as I mentioned before, Judge, just in

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closing, we believe that the Price affidavit is so vague and so ambiguous that it could be lodged against virtually any aircraft that's held in trust. It is devoid of specifics, it is devoid of facts, it is devoid of probable cause, and the State has not fulfilled its obligations to set forth that probable cause in detaining the aircraft. And I'll be happy to take any questions from the Court, Your Honor. No, I appreciate that very much. THE COURT: Thinking about the \$135,000 per engine makes me feel a little better about the cost of an oil change every 10,000 miles. Undoubtedly, Your Honor. MR. EVANS: Anyway, but thank you very much. THE COURT: Mr. Coleman, would you care to respond? I'll be brief, Your Honor. MR. COLEMAN: sure that the Court has read the state's reply to the respondent's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, and we stand on that reply, Your Honor. And the only thing I would like to do is if I may just start by pushing back against a couple of things. THE COURT: Yes, please. MR. COLEMAN: One is this notion that the State had anything to do with the Bureau of Industry

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and Security and their administrative process of detaining these planes and that whole administrative process and it being some type of Fourth Amendment due process violation.

My understanding -- first of all, there was no collusion there. And secondly, my understanding is that as part of their administrative authority, they can detain those planes without due process or any -- the typical process that would come along with a criminal action.

THE COURT: I think he kind of withdrew that for purposes of this. I mean, I appreciate the informational background, but I don't know that -- I think he kind of pulled back on that Fourth Amendment.

MR. COLEMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

Another thing I would like to push back on is this argument by Mr. Evans that somehow these seizure actions were motivated on the part of State by some type of a profit motivation or some type of motivation to forfeit and/or auction these planes.

THE COURT: To get the auction fee?

MR. COLEMAN: This whole business of auction fee. Again, I can't control what a third party puts in their e-mail to someone else. And if that's their intent or if that's what they are inferring, you know,

again, I represent the State of Texas, Your Honor, and I represent to the Court that this was not part of some profit motivated endeavor on the part of the State, Your Honor.

Just a couple of other things --

THE COURT: Well, let me just say, I've known you during my time on the bench, you've appeared in front of me in other cases, and I think you're a very honorable, very effective, very qualified attorney. I don't think you would allow yourself to be used in any way just for purposes of trying to get a fee for the State of Texas. I do think that given your honor, the type of honor that you bring to the profession, you know, if you felt that -- you view this mechanism as a way of seizing assets that would be, you believe, using some criminal activity. And I don't think you'd do anything.

I think the question, though, is have procedures been followed correctly, and I think that's probably what the Court is going to decide. But I would agree with you, you would not participate in anything that was sleazy or anything like that. You're not that kind of lawyer.

MR. COLEMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

And I'd also like to touch on the fact

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that it's been argued that the State's position is that any non-citizen trust is inappropriate. That's not the argument, Your Honor. The State's argument is that the non-citizen trust in this instance, under these circumstances, was used as a sham. It was used to thwart the Chapter 49 of the United States Code,

Chapter 50 of the United States Code; also Chapter 15 of the Code of Federal Register, Section 740.15, which makes the distinction between a temporary sojourn of an aircraft versus an actual export of an aircraft.

And I'll share with the Court a couple of the factors under 15 CFR 740 that require or that are criteria that must be met to either qualify as a temporary sojourn or an actual export.

Chief among them is relinquishment of operational control. Under these circumstances, the trust no longer had operational control. It was a non-citizen who had operational control.

Some of those factors that are criteria that are included in that statute is whether or not the trust or the non-citizen had the authority to hire a cockpit crew; whether or not the non-citizen trust or the -- whether or not the trust or the non-citizen had the ability to dispatch the aircraft; whether or not they could select the route; more importantly, were

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they able to determine where maintenance took place?

Those are some of many of the criteria listed in 15 CFR

740. And some of those were listed in the Price

affidavit.

Another criteria was whether or not the space or the location of the aircraft was determined by the non-citizen. Again, Mr. Price in his affidavit set forth maintenance logs and also maintenance records, logbooks, and made reference to FAA documentation that would indicate that this aircraft spent a significant amount of time in Mexico rather than in the United States.

And under those circumstances and the references that were made on the website that the defendant used for this AGC company that set up this sham trust that talked about circumventing the registration requirements, under the totality of the circumstances, Your Honor, I think that there was sufficient notice and sufficient facts stated in our Notice of Seizure that would be sufficient to put the respondents on notice of our claim.

I'll remind the Court, we're not obligated to lay out our entire case in that affidavit. That's what the discovery process is for. But I think what we are obligated to do is just lay out enough of the

facts, enough of what our bases for our allegations are in order to put the respondents on fair notice of what the nature of the claims are. And I believe we've done that, Your Honor.

In fact, you know, Mr. Evans referred to our burden as, quote-unquote, a heavy burden of proof. It's a burden of proof that is probable cause. It's the same burden that officers use day in and day out from DWI stops to drug cases, and they base their probable cause on their opinion. And that is acceptable, as I understand it, under the law.

For Mr. Price to say in his affidavit that based on his investigation and based on what he discovered during his investigation and based on his training and experience, he formed that opinion that these certain law violations occurred, that is sufficient to get us to probable cause in my understanding of the law, Your Honor.

Also, I'll conclude with this:

There has been testimony -- well, not testimony. There's been references made to other a number of other planes that will be seized. I have no control over what other planes are seized by other District Attorneys throughout the state. The focus here, I believe, in the pleadings are on these two

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planes, the Learjet and the Cessna, Your Honor. don't know that that's appropriate -- an appropriate consideration about what, if any, other planes may be seized. And another thing Mr. Evans talked about was the amount of the damage to the plane by virtue of it just sitting there. Again, that's unsworn testimony, it's conjecture on his part. I have a live witness here who can testify, based on his experience with maintaining planes for a number of decades, whether or not these planes are being properly maintained, Your Honor. We've stated our claim under Chapter 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and we're not looking to occupy any space that's set forth by any Federal Register, federal lawsuit -- federal statute, excuse We're simply looking to enforce a Texas statute, Chapter 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that we've alleged has been violated by the respondents. Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Mr. Coleman. THE COURT: [Pause] Again, thank you. Both sides did an

those dispositive motions, and I am going to allow you

excellent job in the presentation of the issues on

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all to have seven days to provide the Court with some supplemental briefing on the 59.04(b) issue. I think you indicated that that would be a sufficient amount of time to do that.

Since you all have traveled a great distance to be here, and so we don't waste your time and your clients' resources to come again, and since I will be taking the Motion to Dismiss under advisement pending some supplemental briefing, I want to go ahead and discuss the Motion to Access the aircraft to perform maintenance and/or the Motion for Protective Order and just briefly address that so I have some idea of where everyone is coming from. And again, this is the defendant's motion.

MR. BISHOP: Thank you, Your Honor. Since we brought this up at the last hearing, I got some documents from Mr. Coleman's office that included -- I'll call them maintenance records loosely.

THE COURT: And this is on the Learjet?

MR. BISHOP: This is on the Learjet, Your

Honor. Some boxes that were checked and some things that were done. My client still needs access to the aircraft to have his pilots go look at it and see what has or has not been done. Again, as I've offered to Mr. Coleman, if he wants to be there, whoever he wants

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to -- we're not going to move the aircraft. Simply to go and look and see what has or hasn't been done and what needs to be done to the aircraft. I don't know that they need more than a couple or three hours. But we would ask -
THE COURT: Is this something that could be worked out by an agreed order?

MR. BISHOP: I've asked, Judge. I don't know.

MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, I will concede that under Chapter 34 of the Civil Rules of Procedure, that the respondents are entitled to access if they petition

under Chapter 34 of the Civil Rules of Procedure, that
the respondents are entitled to access if they petition
the Court for access to the plane. I'll concede
access, Your Honor. But there is no statutory
authority that I'm aware of that allows them to
manipulate this plane, in other words, to quote-unquote
maintain this plane, Your Honor. Again, I've got
testimony here, if you'd like to hear it, about whether
or not it's being properly maintained. But, Your
Honor, Rule 34 certainly covers inspection -- access
to and inspection. But I'm not aware of any other
authority that allows them to come in while this plane
is in the custody of the state and perform any
maintenance or anything related to that plane.

THE COURT: So the bottom line is that the

THE COURT: So the bottom line is that the State is not amenable to working out an agreed order on

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the protocols that need to be used or would need to be used to ensure that the claim is being properly maintained. I'm hearing from Mr. Bishop that it would probably take three or four hours with representatives from both sides present just simply to look at the plane -- I don't know -- crank up the engines or do whatever.

Or do I need to have a full evidentiary hearing on plane maintenance? That sounds like it's going to take some time, and you have a witness here.

MR. COLEMAN: It's the State's position that these two planes are being properly maintained, Your Honor. And we've got testimony and evidence we're willing to put on the record to that effect.

MR. BISHOP: Judge, I'll say I find it puzzling that they refuse to allow licensed pilots and aircraft mechanics to perform maintenance on the aircraft while they've got them seized. I don't know why, to be honest, they would object to that. But apparently they do. But I would ask that the motion be granted and that we be ordered to schedule some time when all the parties can be there and go to the aircraft.

And on a related note, I had also asked Mr. Coleman last week and didn't get a response from

him whether or not the aircraft was going to be flown any time soon. And the reason that I'm asking is because my client wants to know if he needs to get the aircraft insurance that covers -- apparently, you can have coverage for an aircraft that's going to be flown or just ground coverage. Obviously, there is a difference in coverage and a difference in premium. My client is not going to be flying the aircraft, obviously, while it's in the custody of the State, but I don't know whether Mr. Coleman intends to have somebody fly it and I need to get an answer to that so that I can make sure we've got the insurance.

THE COURT: Mr. Coleman?

MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, I'll defer to my technical expert on that issue. Again, I'm more than willing --

THE COURT: Well, this is on the issue of whether or not the State is going to fly the plane so he can either pay a higher, probably exorbitantly higher premium for the plane -- or pay the storage premium, which is probably much less.

MR. COLEMAN: Your Honor, in my understanding, and this is completely as a lay person, you know, there is maintenance that needs to be performed for storage and there is maintenance to be performed for

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cross-examine.

airworthiness, and the state's position is that we are doing the necessary maintenance to keep the plane in good working order for maintenance and for storage and not necessarily for airworthiness. And that's all that's needed under these circumstances. And again, I've got an expert who is willing to testify on that area, Judge. THE COURT: Okav. So that I'm clear -- and we've been going about two hours and I'm sure our court reporter has been very gracious, our courtroom deputy, my law clerk, others here, to sit here for doing the arguments on the dispositive motions. But what I'm hearing is there isn't going to be an agreement on protocol to follow. The Court has some difficulty in crafting, on its own, a motion -- I think we all agree that on the Protective Order, we all agree that some maintenance needs to be done. Otherwise, the plane will literally disintegrate out there. And, you know, if that's going to be -how much time do you need to put on some evidence from your perspective? MR. COLEMAN: No more than 30 minutes, Your Honor. THE COURT: And you would need to

Are you prepared to do that?

MR. BISHOP: Judge, I'm a little surprised we're having an evidentiary hearing today on what was on the pleadings, but I think the issues are whether or not my client should have any access to the plane, which he concedes. And also --

THE COURT: Well, I think what he may be saying in reference to this witness is that, no, you don't need to have access to it because the State of Texas is taking care of it.

MR. COLEMAN: No, actually, Your Honor, I agree with Mr. Bishop on that particular point in that I am willing under Rule 34 of the Civil Rules of Procedure to give he and his client access to inspect the plane, but what I am opposed to is any manipulation under the guise of, quote-unquote, maintenance. It's the state's position that we are properly maintaining the plane and we are willing to put on evidence of that.

THE COURT: Manipulation, I don't understand. What do you mean by manipulation?

MR. COLEMAN: I don't know that the rules allow for the respondent to go in and -- the only term I can think of is "manipulate" it, because they are actually doing something, performing an act on the property, and that act being maintaining it.

We're happy to put on testimony about what

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is being done and what needs to be done. And at the Court's direction, after hearing testimony, if the Court thinks we need to do more, then we're open to doing more. But what I'm not conceding is that there is legal authority to allow the respondents to go and tamper with this plane while it's in our custody. MR. BISHOP: Your Honor, this may be an easier solution. What if my clients -- and I say my clients. I believe it's going to be a pilot who flies the aircraft, and maybe a mechanic or two along with him, can go to the aircraft, inspect the aircraft. Mr. Coleman can be there, whoever he want to be there. THE COURT: When you say "inspect" the aircraft, what do you mean? MR. BISHOP: I'll say look under the hood for not knowing any better terminology. THE COURT: Are you talking about flying it around? MR. BISHOP: Not flying it. No, it won't be moved, it won't be flown. It will simply be visually looked at. And I don't know enough about aircraft mechanics, although I know Mr. Evans does, to tell you exactly what they will do. But it will be an onsite inspection to go visit the aircraft, take a look at what shape it is in, see what has or has not been done.

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Then at that point folks that are more qualified than I would be able to come up here and testify, if we need, and rebut what I assume Mr. Purvis would say, and would say, "No, Judge, the following things need to be done and here's why." But until we can get down there and actually see the aircraft, I don't know how we're going to know what does or doesn't need to take place. So I think maybe rather than getting into testimony today, if we could access, which I think Mr. Coleman has no objection to, the aircraft and then if I could simply get an answer on whether the aircraft would be flown or not so that we can resolve the insurance, we could reserve the right, if we need to, to come back to the Court on maintenance issues. THE COURT: Okay, two things: Mr. Coleman, do you have any problem in letting the defendant, Learjet, know within seven days whether or not the State of Texas is intends to fly this airplane? MR. COLEMAN: May I have just a brief moment to confer with my witness here? THE COURT: Yes, you may. MR. COLEMAN: Thank you. [Pause]

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Your Honor, I'm being told that there is no intent to fly the aircraft. However, to use an industry term, there will be "ground runs" that will be performed. What's a "ground run"? THE COURT: Your Honor, a "ground run" is MR. PURVIS: basically you pull the aircraft out of the hangar, you check the oil levels, you check, you know, all the fluid levels, and you have a qualified pilot, which we have on our staff, that would start the engines, warm the engines up to normal operating temperatures. THE COURT: Would it fly? MR. PURVIS: No, sir. THE COURT: Mr. Coleman, is that a representation in court you would not fly this plane? MR. COLEMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Would that satisfy your client's THE COURT: need to know what type of insurance policy to purchase? MR. BISHOP: I don't know the particulars on a ground run, but Mr. Coleman is representing to me and the Court that they will not fly the plane. And I take it that if that changes, you will let me know with some notice beforehand? MR. COLEMAN: I'm happy to do that. THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. BISHOP: Then that will settle that, Judge. All right. Now, the next thing THE COURT: is this: What the defendant has said is they want three or four hours to go out with their pilots and mechanics, with the state's pilots and mechanics, to look at the plane, not to fly the plane. I will tell you that seems very reasonable to me. They've got a million dollar investment there. MR. COLEMAN: I have no objection to an inspection, Your Honor, access and inspection to the aircraft. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Bishop, is that sufficient? It certainly is for now, Judge, MR. BISHOP: to be able to access and inspect the airplane. there are maintenance issues that come up that we feel need to be performed, we can raise them after the inspection. Okay. I would appreciate, either THE COURT: by agreement, because this gets into a technical area --I mean, I'm willing to issue that Protective Order and grant that Motion to Inspect the plane. But so that I don't run afoul of some technical aviation term, I would appreciate you all providing me quickly a proposed order on that, because I will enter that. Ι

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think that it's most reasonable to allow the defendant to at least make sure and verify that the plane is being properly maintained. And Mr. Purvis, I'm not suggesting that your people don't know how to maintain a plane, but they are the owners of the plane and they certainly have a right to be assured that the plane is being properly maintained and inspected. So I'm going to grant that order. just in case there is any technical language in that order, I don't want to have to say, "Well, you didn't go far enough, you didn't" -- whatever it is I need to know. Mr. Evans, you looked like you were about to offer or weigh in on this. MR. EVANS: Thank you, Your Honor. We'd just like to have the -- we don't have a pending motion in that regard right now, but I --THE COURT: But you would like an order like that for Cessna? Yes, Your Honor. MR. EVANS: THE COURT: I'll grant that, but I want to make sure it's the right order. MR. EVANS: Yeah. And the key terminology, Your Honor -- and I bet you I could probably get

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Mr. Purvis to agree with this -- is that the manufacturer sets forth the periodic maintenance and storage terms for the aircraft. It's in black and white, it's in the maintenance manuals. So that's an objective standard with respect to how the aircraft -- in the case of the Citation, it's Chapter 10 of the maintenance manual. And it basically outlines you must do this in order to properly maintain the aircraft, which should be the guided document with respect to both aircraft.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, and then whatever that protocol is, I want it in the Protective Order. And then if either defendant feels that the State is not in compliance with that order, then I suspect I would be hearing from you.

And, of course, I'm dealing with this now,
I'm not even dealing with the 12(b)(6) issues and the
other Motions to Dismiss issues. But I want to make
sure I have something in place regardless of how that -even during the pendency of the time where the Court
will be issuing its order on those Motions to Dismiss,
I want to make sure these planes are protected.

Am I clear?

MR. COLEMAN: Crystal clear, Your Honor.

MR. BISHOP: Yes, Your Honor, we'll draft a

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1 proposed order and send it to Mr. Coleman as soon as we 2 can get it. 3 THE COURT: All right, I'd like to have that 4 ready to be entered by the close of business tomorrow. 5 MR. BISHOP: We can do that, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Mr. Coleman, are you good with 7 that? 8 MR. COLEMAN: No objection, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Purvis, I know I didn't put you under oath, but are you going to take 10 good care of that plane for the next 48 hours? 11 12 MR. PURVIS: Yes, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: And there is no damage to that 14 plane that's going to happen in the next 48 hours, 15 either the Cessna or Learjet? 16 MR. EVANS: As I mentioned before, Your Honor, 17 due to a combination of factors, unless there is 18 something that's been done to the Citation between 19 January and August that we're not aware of, I have no 20 documentation to that effect right now. The mere fact 2.1 that if the aircraft was not subjected to the periodic 22 required maintenance by the engine manufacturer in the 23 six or seven month period, they are going to be 24 removed -- they must be removed and sent to the engine 25 manufacturer. So I would not like to be seen in open

1 court as saying there is no damage to the aircraft, 2 because it's very likely that there is substantial 3 damage to the aircraft. 4 THE COURT: But another 48 hours would not, 5 from your perspective, cause any more damage in all 6 probability? 7 No, Your Honor. MR. EVANS: 8 Okay. I intend to get that THE COURT: 9 Protective Order entered by the close of business 10 I'm giving you all time to make sure. tomorrow. you are making reference to a maintenance manual of the 11 12 airplanes as setting the protocol, fine, but we need to 13 have that put in place. 14 All right. Is there anything else that 15 needs to come before the Court at this time? 16 MR. COLEMAN: Nothing further from the State 17 of Texas. 18 MR. BISHOP: Nothing further, Your Honor. 19 MR. EVANS: Nothing further, Your Honor, thank 20 you. 21 All right, I appreciate it. THE COURT: 22 sides did an excellent job, very professional, and I 23 thank you for your being prepared for today's hearing. And with that, we stand adjourned. 24 25 [12:14 p.m. - Proceedings adjourned]

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I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause.

/s/ Ed Reed
Edward L. Reed
Court Reporter

<u>11-19-20</u> Date

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